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Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Spaziano v. Florida,1 the United States Supreme Court made
two important decisions. First, the Court held that a jury need not
be instructed about lesser included offenses if the defendant cannot
be convicted of those offenses. 2 Second and more importantly, the
Court held that Florida's death penalty statute is constitutional,
even though the trial judge can disregard the jury's decision on the
appropriateness of the death penalty.3 This Note focuses on the
second of these holdings, because in upholding the Florida statute,
the Supreme Court departed from its established method of analyz-
ing capital punishment statutes by failing to defer to the statutory
schemes adopted in a majority of the states. 4 The Court previously
has recognized that the death penalty is a national concern and, as
such, deserves fairly uniform treatment.5 Statutory enactments typi-
cally reflect community beliefs, and when taken as a whole, the stat-
utes compose the national attitude.6 Further, this Note argues that
Florida's death penalty statute violates the eighth amendment of the
Constitution, because to comport with the requirements of the
eighth amendment, the question of life or death must be left to the
jury.7
1 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
2 Id. at 3161. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
3 Id. at 3165. See infra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
4 Id. at 3164-65. See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
7 Although this Note argues that the death sentence should be imposed by a jury, it




Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Geor-
gia," the Court has reviewed many death penalty cases, establishing
a framework for analyzing these decisions in light of the eighth9 and
fourteenth amendments. 10 This framework generally has three in-
terrelated and overlapping components. First, the imposition of the
death penalty must be consistent with community values and evolv-
ing standards of human decency. 1 Second, death must be a punish-
ment proportionate to the crime for which it is sought.' 2 Finally,
the death penalty must be applied in a consistent and nonarbitrary
fashion. 13
In determining whether a particular state's death penalty stat-
ute reflects community values and evolving standards of decency,
the Court has surveyed and relied on the death penalty statutes used
in other states, as well as the current trend of the law.' 4 The Court
has engaged in this method of analysis to ensure that particular stat-
utory schemes impose death only in appropriate cases.' 5 Hence, as
Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Spaziano:
In the 12 years since Furman v. Georgia, every Member of this
Court has written or joined at least one opinion endorsing the propo-
sition that because of its severity and irrevocability, the death penalty
is qualitatively different from any other punishment, and hence must
be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified
8 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The Furman decision was a consolidation of the
appeals of one murderer and one rapist sentenced to death under Georgia law and one
rapist sentenced to death under Texas law. The Court held that because the death pen-
alty statutes in these states were discretionary and very likely to achieve arbitrary and
discriminatory results, they violated the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual" pun-
ishment clause. Id. at 240. See also F. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 113-
25 (1978) (analyzing the Furman decision and the States' reaction to it).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Court has held that the fourteenth amendment extends the restrictions of the
eighth amendment to the states. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
11 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 241-42.
12 See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3008-09 (1983); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597-99 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
13 Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
14 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-95 (1982); Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97.
15 Coker, 433 U.S. at 593.
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response to a given offense.' 6
The Court has noted that a particular case is appropriate for the
death sentence when "public" sentiment supports the sentence. 17
The Court has made it clear that this "public" is national rather than
local or regional18 because the Court has characterized the death
penalty as a national concern. 19 Thus, in an attempt to articulate
the national attitude toward the death penalty, the Court consist-
ently has relied upon the national sentiment represented by the ma-
jority of state statutes because it views state legislation as reflective
of the view of the majority of the national population. In Coker v.
Georgia,20 for example, the Court surveyed death penalty statutes
adopted in other states. 21 The Court relied on the values reflected
in this legislation when declaring Georgia's statute unconstitutional
because, in certain cases, the statute provided death as the punish-
ment for rapists.22
Capital punishment differs from typical criminal sanctions be-
cause of this strong public sentiment about the nature of the death
penalty and the circumstances for which it is appropriate. 23 The
16 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3167 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citation omitted).
17 Coker, 433 U.S. at 594.
18 Id. at 593-94.
19 Id. at 592. In Coker, the Court noted that "attention must be given to the public
attitudes concerning a particular sentence-history and precedent, legislative attitudes,
and the response ofjuries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted."
Id. The Court, however, has also stated:
Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily
in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment per-
mits imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a
felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not
himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will
be employed. We have concluded, along with most legislatures and juries, that it
does not.
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
20 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). In Coker, the Court held that a death sen-
tence for the crime of rape of an adult woman was a "grossly disproportionate and ex-
cessive punishment." Id. at 592. Although the Court observed that rape was a serious
crime that deserves a serious punishment, it determined that a rapist who did not take
human life did not deserve to die for the crime. Id. at 597-99. The Court refused to
allow a punishment for rape that in certain circumstances could exceed the penalty for
murder. Id. at 600. The Court noted that under Georgia's death penalty statute, the
sentencer must find only one of the statutory aggravating circumstances before impos-
ing the death penalty. Id. at 598. It was possible, therefore, that a rapist who committed
his crime with an aggravating circumstance could have received death, although a mur-
derer who committed a murder without any aggravating circumstances could not. Id. at
600. Thus, the Court reversed the petitioner's death sentence. Id.
21 Id. at 593-97.
22 Id.
23 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-82. See also H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
65-92 (3d ed. 1982). Bedau found that the public favors having a death penalty law by a
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Court, therefore, has recognized that death penalty questions are
not limited to a single state's values. In its analyses, the Court has
stressed the values of the nation as a whole and has attempted to
adopt in its holdings the view endorsed by the majority of the popu-
lation through their state statutes. 24
In addition to examining the laws in other states, the Court also
has looked to the proportionality of the sentence.25 When defining
the limits of a "proportional sentence," the Court has articulated
virtually an "eye for an eye" test, finding death an appropriate pun-
ishment only in cases involving murder.26 For instance, in Coker, the
Court held that death was a per se disproportionate punishment for
the crime of rape because that crime did not result in the loss of
life. 27 Similarly, in Enmund v. Florida,28 the Court refused to uphold
the death sentence of an individual simply because a co-defendant
murdered someone during the course of a felony.29 The "eye for an
eye" requirement ensures that the death sentence in a particular
case or for a particular crime comports with the community's sense
of justice or fairness.
Finally, the Court has recognized that death penalty statutes
must be consistent and nonarbitrary in application to meet the stan-
dards espoused in Furman, as well as be reflective of community val-
two-to-one margin, but the average person is indifferent to whether the executions take
place quickly or, in some cases, at all. Id.
24 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977).
In Coker, the Court surveyed the death penalties adopted in other states and con-
cluded that of the sixteen states in which rape was a capital offense before Furman, only
three-Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana-provided for the death penalty in rape
cases after Furman. 433 U.S. at 594. After later Supreme Court decisions, only Georgia
allowed a rapist to be sentenced to death. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
The Court placed great weight on the fact that in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
post-Furman legislation in a large majority of the states had "heavily influenced" the
Court's decision. 433 U.S. at 594.
25 "Punishment may be cruel and unusual because of its barbarity or because it is
excessive or disproportionate to the offense." Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3172 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
26 See supra note 25; infra notes 27-28.
27 Coker, 433 U.S. at 598-99. See supra note 20.
28 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In Enmund, the Court held that the sentence of death was a
disproportionate penalty for a robber who did not murder, although a co-defendant did
commit a murder in the course of the robbery. The Court refused on proportionality
grounds to affirm the death sentence of a person "who does not himself kill, attempt to
kill or intend that a killing take place." Id. at 797. The Court once again weighed the
severity of the crime against the punishment of death and concluded that a robber who
does not take a life cannot receive the death penalty. Id. at 797-99.
29 Id. at 801.
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ues.3 0 Thus, the Court has approved capital punishment statutes
that establish "aggravating" and "mitigating" circumstances which
provide the sentencer with standards to guide its death penalty deci-
sion.3 ' The Court has reasoned that statutory guidelines ensure
consistent and nonarbitrary application of capital punishment by
limiting a sentencer's discretion in imposing death. The sentencer
must follow the guidelines and may impose the penalty only when
the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.3 2
In short, the Court has concluded that the death penalty differs
greatly from other types of criminal sanctions. Thus, the Court has
established standards to guide its review of various capital punish-
ment statutes. The Court, therefore, has stressed the importance of
having capital punishment decisions comport with community val-
ues expressed through the laws of the states. Still, the concept of
fair and consistent applications of the death penalty should impact
greatly on the Court's decision.
III. FACTS
On September 12, 1975, the petitioner, Joseph Robert Spazi-
ano, was indicted by a Seminole County, Florida, grand jury for the
murder33 of Laura Lynn Harberts.3 4 Ms. Harberts' decomposing
body was discovered on August 21, 1973, in a garbage dump in
30 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1977). In Lockett, the Court held that
Ohio's capital punishment statute, which imposed a mandatory death penalty, violated
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 609.
31 SeeJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion approving Texas statu-
tory scheme); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion approving Flor-
ida statutory scheme); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (approving Georgia
statutory scheme). See also infra notes 44-45 (Florida statute).
32 See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Proffitt, the
Court upheld Florida's capital punishment statute because it addressed the constitu-
tional deficiencies identified in Furman by having the sentencer weigh the legislatively
prescribed aggravating and mitigating factors against one another. Id. at 260. But cf.
Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (holding that trial judge could take into ac-
count aggravating factor not legislatively enumerated provided that discretion was not
so arbitrary as to violate Constitution).
33 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(l)(a) (West 1976) provides:
The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from a premeditated de-
sign to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, or when committed
by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any
arson, involuntary sexual battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or
unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, or
which resulted from the unlawful distribution of heroin by a person 18 years of age
or older when such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the
user, shall be murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punish-
able as provided in § 775.082.
34 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Seminole County. 35
At trial, Anthony Dilisio, 36 a sixteen-year-old acquaintance of
Spaziano, was the State's principal witness. 37 Dilisio testified that
the petitioner had taken him and another individual to the garbage
dump to show them where Spaziano had raped and tortured two
women. 38 An unidentified witness 39 also testified that Spaziano told
him that he cut off Harberts' breasts and cut out her vagina while
she was still living.40
After deliberation, the jury found Spaziano guilty of murder in
the first degree. 41 In accordance with Florida law,42 the trial court
conducted a separate sentencing hearing after Spaziano's conviction
of the capital felony to determine if the death penalty should be im-
posed.43 At this sentencing hearing, the State and the defendant
presented evidence of aggravating 44 and mitigating45 circumstances
35 Id.
36 The defense unsuccessfuly challenged Dilisio's credibility at trial because of his
tendency to exaggerate and his admitted use of drugs both before and after his visit to
the garbage dump. Id. Dilisio denied having taken drugs on the day the petitioner took
him to the dump. Spaziano v. Florida, 393 So. 2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 1981), aff'd, 104 S.
Ct. 3154 (1984). The Supreme Court of Florida noted, however, that Dilisio's drug use
did not impair his directing the police to the dump. Id.
37 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3157.
38 Id. Another body that was never identified was also found. Spaziano, 393 So. 2d at
1119.
39 The Petitioner's Brief, Respondent's Brief, and the appellate cases do not indicate
the identity of this witness.
40 Joint Appendix at 44, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
41 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
42 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1985).
43 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3158.
44 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprison-
ment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was
an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after com-
mitting or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, kid-
napping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated,
and premeditated manner without any pretense or moral or legal justification.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge did not allow the state to introduce evidence of
the petitioner's conviction of forcible carnal knowledge and aggravated battery, Spazi-
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to the same jury that had convicted Spaziano.46 A majority of the
jury recommended that the petitioner be sentenced to life imprison-
ment.47 Nevertheless, the trial court in Spaziano's case disregarded
the jury's recommendation, then determined that the aggravating
circumstances 48 outweighed the mitigating circumstances and im-
posed the sentence of death.49 Under Florida law, Spaziano's death
sentence was appealed automatically to the Supreme Court of
Florida. 50
ano v. Florida, 433 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1983), because that conviction was on appeal.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in its review of the case, found that the trial judge should
have permitted introduction of these convictions in light of its own decision in Peek v.
State, 395 So. 2d 492, 499 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964 (1981) (trial judge may
properly consider convictions on appeal during sentencing). Spaziano v. Florida, 433
So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1983), aft'd, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
45 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by an-
other person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domi-
nation of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
46 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3157-58. Justice Stevens described Florida's death penalty
scheme as follows:
Florida has adopted an unusual "trifurcated" procedure for identifying the per-
sons convicted of a capital felony who shall be sentenced to death. It consists of a
determination of guilt or innocence by the jury, an advisory sentence by the jury,
and an actual sentence imposed by the trial judge. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
248-50 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The judge's determi-
nation is then reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial judge are supported by
the evidence and justify a sentence of death. Id. at 250-51, 253.
104 S. Ct. at 3168 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1985).
47 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3158.
48 The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: Spaziano had mur-
dered Ms. Harberts in an especially heinous and atrocious way, and Spaziano had been
convicted previously of a felony in which he used or threatened to use violence. Id. On
August 13, 1975, the petitioner had been sentenced to life imprisonment for a violent
sex crime that occurred on February 9, 1974. Joint Appendix at 14, Spaziano v. Florida,
104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984). This information was contained in a presentence investigation
ordered by the court. 104 S. Ct. at 3158.
49 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3158.
50 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic
review by the Supreme Court of Florida within sixty (60) days after certification by
the sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended for an addi-
tional period not to exceed thirty (30) days by the Supreme Court for good cause
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Spaziano's murder con-
viction, but reversed the death sentence on two grounds. First, the
court found that the trial judge should not have considered a confi-
dential portion of the presentence investigation report in his sen-
tencing decision. 51 Neither the State nor the defendant had the
opportunity to review this report. 52 The Supreme Court of Florida
reasoned that Gardner v. Florida53 afforded the petitioner an oppor-
tunity to respond to the evidence contained in the presentence
report.54
Second, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's ar-
gument that the trial court had erred by failing to instruct the jury
on lesser included offenses as provided for by Beck v. Alabama.55
The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included,
noncapital offenses of attempted first degree murder, second degree
murder, third degree murder, and manslaughter unless Spaziano
would waive the statute of limitations.5 6 The two-year statute of
limitations had run on these noncapital offenses prior to the discov-
ery of Harberts' body.57 Spaziano refused to make such a waiver.58
shown. Such review by the Supreme Court shall have priority over all other cases
and shall be heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
51 Spaziano v. Florida, 393 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Fla. 1981). This portion contained
information about the petitioner's previous felony convictions and other charges
brought against the petitioner. Id.
52 Id.
53 430 U.S. 349 (1977). In Gardner, the United States Supreme Court held that the
petitioner was denied due process because the Florida trial judge overrode a jury's rec-
ommendation of a life sentence after relying in part on portions of a presentence investi-
gation report that were not disclosed to either party. The Court concluded that because
the petitioner did not have the opportunity to refute or explain the information, the trial
judge erred in imposing the death sentence. Id. at 362. The Court in Gardner, however,
did not consider the constitutionality of Florida's statutory death penalty scheme.
54 393 So. 2d at 1122.
55 Spaziano, 393 So. 2d at 1122 (discussing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)). In
Beck, the United States Supreme Court held that Alabama's death penalty statute was
unconstitutional because the trial judge was precluded from instructing the jury on a
lesser included offense for a capital crime. 447 U.S. at 647. The Alabama statute left the
jury with only two choices, either convicting a defendant of a capital crime for which it
must impose the death penalty, or acquitting the defendant. The Court concluded that
because jurors were presented with these extreme choices, there existed the possibility
that jurors might either acquit an otherwise guilty defendant in order to avoid the impo-
sition of the death penalty or convict a guilty person who should not be killed simply
because death was preferable to releasing the defendant. Id. at 643. Thus, the Court
decided that "both the eighth amendment as made applicable to the states by the four-
teenth amendment and the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment" were
violated by "substantially increasing the risk of error in the fact finding process." Id. at
632.
56 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
57 In 1973, the time of the offense, Florida had a two-year statute of limitations for
noncapital offenses. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.465(2) (West 1973). The murder occurred
820 [Vol. 75
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The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that because the peti-
tioner could not have been convicted on any lesser charge resulting
from the failure to make such a waiver, Beck did not require such
instructions. 59 Thus, the Florida court remanded the case to the
trial judge for resentencing. 60
On remand, the trial judge ordered the preparation of a new
presentence report.61 At resentencing, the petitioner was allowed
to, but did not respond to the information contained in the report.62
Once again, after review of the record, the judge determined that
the aggravating circumstances justified the petitioner's death
sentence. 63
On automatic appeal,64 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
Spaziano's death sentence. 65 The Florida court refused to accept
the petitioner's argument that the State should not have introduced
additional evidence concerning the petitioner's previous felony con-
victions in the second sentencing proceeding.66 The Florida court
found that the original presentence report contained the informa-
tion and that the trial judge improperly excluded such evidence
originally.67 The Supreme Court of Florida also rejected the peti-
tioner's contention that the trial judge had erred by not allowing the
jury to consider the felony convictions in its advisory opinion, even
though the trial judge had considered them in his sentencing deci-
sion.68 In addition, the petitioner argued that the trial court had
considered his prior felony convictions and these convictions were
improper aggravating circumstances. 69 The Florida court stated
that it had held previously that prior felony convictions constituted
legitimate aggravating circumstances.70
The petitioner also contended that failing to follow the jury's
recommendation violated the double jeopardy protections of the
sometime before August 21, 1973, the date the body was discovered; however, the peti-
tioner was not indicted until September 12, 1975, after the running of the two-year
statute of limitations. There is no statute of limitations for first degree murder. See id. at
§ 932.465(1).
58 Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
59 393 So. 2d at 1122.
60 Id. at 1123.
61 Joint Appendix at 14, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
62 Id. at 15.
63 Id.
64 See supra note 50.
65 Spaziano v. Florida, 433 So. 2d 508, 512 (1983).
66 Id. at 510.
67 433 So. 2d at 510-11. See also supra note 44.




fifth amendment, 7' as articulated in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Bullington v. Missouri.72 The Florida Supreme
Court held that it had previously rejected a similar argument in
Douglas v. State.73 Finally, the petitioner alleged that he was denied
due process when the resentencing hearing was assigned to the
same judge.74 The Florida court reasoned that similar arguments
had been rejected by other courts and should not be adopted in this
case.
75
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on January
9, 1984.76
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In a six-three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Florida. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, 77 held that the Florida Supreme Court had not erred in
its decision to affirm the petitioner's death sentence even though
the trial court had refused to give the jury an instruction of lesser
included offenses and the trial judge had refused to adopt the jury's
recommended decision of a life sentence. 78
The Court first reviewed the petitioner's contention that the
trial court should have given the jury an instruction on lesser in-
cluded offenses. 79 The Court recognized that in Beck v. Alabama,80 it
had determined that when a jury does not have the option of choos-
71 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "[N]or shall any person be subject to the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
72 451 U.S. 430 (1981). In Bullington, the Court held that Missouri's capital sentenc-
ing proceeding before a jury was so similar to a trial of guilt and innocence that in case
of a new trial, the double jeopardy protections attach to the second sentencing proce-
dure. Id. at 446. Thus, a defendant cannot be sentenced to death in a retrial after the
original jury had sentenced him to life imprisonment. Id. at 445.
73 373 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1979). In Douglas, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the
petitioner's double jeopardy claim because the jury's opinion is merely advisory and
only a binding jury verdict would violate Furman v. Georgia. Douglas, 373 So. 2d. at 896-
97.
74 433 So. 2d at 512.
75 Id. (citing United States v. Gaither, 503 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 961 (1975); Douglas v. Wainwright, 521 F. Supp. 790 (M.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd in part,
714 F.2d 1532 (1983)).
76 Joint Appendix at 53, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
77 Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and
O'Connor. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment.
78 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3161, 3164.
79 Id. at 3159.
80 447 U.S. 625 (1980); see supra note 55.
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ing a lesser included offense, 81 a risk of an unwarranted conviction
is created, and that this risk increases where the death penalty is
involved.8 2 The Court, however, reasoned that Spaziano was at-
tempting to benefit from having the jury instructed of the lesser in-
cluded offenses and, at the same time, set up the defense of the
expired period of limitations on those offenses.83 Although a con-
stitutionally fair capital trial generally requires a lesser included of-
fense instruction, 84 the Court held that the purpose behind this
requirement, enhancing the rationality and reliability of jury delib-
erations, 85 is not served by tricking a jury into believing a choice of
crimes exists when in actuality none does.8 6 The Court concluded
that either the defendant must waive the statute of limitations, bene-
fitting by a possible conviction on a lesser included offense, or re-
fuse to waive the statute, benefitting by either a guilt or innocence
decision on only the capital charge. 87 The Court held, however,
that the choice of benefitting from the lesser included offense in-
struction or asserting the statute of limitations on those offenses was
the defendant's alone.8 8 Thus, the trial court did not err in its re-
fusal to instruct the jury of the lesser included offenses because the
petitioner refused to waive the statute of limitations.89
81 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3159-60. The Court in Beck determined that
[w]hen the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a seri-
ous, violent offense-but leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would
justify conviction of a capital offense-the failure to give the jury the "third option"
of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk
of an unwarranted conviction.
Such a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake.
447 U.S. at 637.
82 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3159-60.
83 Id. at 3160. Because the two-year period of limitations had run on all but the
capital offense, if the jury had returned a verdict on only one of those lesser offenses,
Spaziano would have eluded the possibility of being sentenced at all.
84 Id.
85 Id. The Court observed that:
The absence of a lesser included offense instruction increases the risk that the jury
will convict, not because it is persuaded that the defendant is guilty of capital mur-
der, but simply to avoid setting the defendant free. In Beck, [447 U.S. 625 (1980)]
the Court found that risk unacceptable and inconsistent with the reliability this
Court has demanded in capital proceedings. Id. at 643. The goal of the Beck rule, in
other words, is to eliminate the distortion of the fact-finding process that is created
when the jury is forced into an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and
innocence. Id. at 638-643. Requiring that the jury be instructed on lesser included
offenses for which the defendant may not be convicted, however, would simply in-
troduce another type of distortion into the fact-finding process.
Id.
86 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3160.




The Court then confronted the major issue in the case:
whether a trial judge can override the jury's recommended sentence
of life imprisonment and impose the death penalty.90 The Court de-
termined that the fundamental premise of the petitioner's argument
was that the jury, not the judge, should make the sentencing deci-
sions in a capital case.9' In fact, the Court noted that a capital sen-
tencing proceeding often resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or
innocence. 92 The Court also recognized that the double jeopardy
clause 93 prohibits multiple attempts by the State to convince the
sentencer to impose the death penalty, just as it prevents the retrial
of an individual who has been found not guilty.94
The Court, however, refused to hold that defendants have a
right to a sentencing hearing before a jury or that a judge must fol-
low a jury's recommendation. 95 Although the Court wanted to pro-
tect against the imposition of an erroneous death sentence, it noted
that a jury does not guarantee this protection any more than a
judge.96 The Court determined that a capital sentencing proceed-
ing involves the same issues as any other sentencing proceeding 97
and refused to hold that the sixth amendment 98 guaranteed a jury
decision on the death question. 99
The Court then proceeded to reject the petitioner's argument
that the eighth amendment entitled the defendant to a binding jury
determination of his death sentence.i00 Petitioner argued that ju-
ries best effectuate the purpose behind the eighth amendment be-
cause juries are inherently better decision-makers than judges.I0 l
Petitioner further contended thatjuries are more consistent and less
90 Id.
9' Id.
92 Id. at 3162.
93 U.S. CONST. amend V provides, in part, "nor shall any person be subject to the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
94 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3162; see also supra note 72.
95 Id. at 3163-64.
96 Id. at 3164.
97 Id. at 3162. The Court stated that "the fundamental issue involved in any other
sentencing proceeding-[is] a determination of the appropriate punishment to be im-
posed on an individual." Id.
98 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
99 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3163.
100 Id. at 3163-65.
1o Id. at 3163.
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arbitrary than judges in making death decisions, that imposition of
the death penalty by a jury better serves the death penalty's retribu-
tive function, and, finally, that because a majority of the states re-
quire capital sentencing by a jury, an eighth amendment norm of
jury sentencing had been established. 10 2
The petitioner contended that capital punishment inherently
differs from noncapital punishment sentences. 10 3 Furthermore, ju-
ries are more representative of the population than judges and
therefore make better capital punishment decisions. 10 4 The Court
rejected this argument, noting that it had held that the constitution-
ality of a death penalty statute rests solely on compliance with the
"twin objectives" of "measured, consistent application and fairness
to the accused." 10 5 The Court noted that legislatively adopted safe-
guards 106 attempt to protect against arbitrary application of the
death penalty. 10 7 In addition, the Court held that a qualitative dif-
ference in the death penalty does not require that death, as opposed
to other sentences, be imposed by a jury.10 8 Moreover, the Court
noted that it had ruled specifically' 09 that Florida's death penalty
scheme achieved a reasonable balance between "sensitivity to the
individual and his circumstances" while ensuring the compliance
with the "twin objectives." 01
The petitioner also urged that the retributive nature of the
death penalty distinguishes it from other types of criminal punish-
ments and, as such, requires imposition by a jury."'I The Court re-
viewed the various reasons behind the imposition of criminal
sentences-rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, and retribu-
tion. 112 After indicating that retribution is "an expression of com-
102 Id. at 3162-63.
103 Id. at 3163.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 3162. The State need only be able to "rationally distinguish between those
individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not." Id.
at 3162-63. See also Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).
106 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1985) (aggravating circum-
stances); id. at § 921.141(6) (mitigating circumstances); supra notes 44 and 45.
107 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3162-63.
108 Id. at 3163.
109 See Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
110 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3165.
111 Id. at 3163.
112 Id. The Court has characterized retribution as follows:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct
in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting
the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organ-
ized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punish-
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munity outrage," the Court concluded that retribution alone does
notjustify the death penalty. 113 Deterrence could be a primary jus-
tification for the death penalty, however, and other sentencing rea-
sons may also play a factor.1 4 Thus, the Court determined that the
purposes behind the death penalty do not always differ from non-
capital penalties.
The Court also indicated that because the sentencer weighs the
aggravating and mitigating factors 115 in the determination of the im-
position of death-factors espoused by the legislature as the voice
of the community-community values are inherent in all death pen-
alty cases. A jury, therefore, is unnecessary to guarantee the pres-
ence of the community in a death decision. 16 Further, the decision
of the sentencer, be it a judge or jury, is automatically reviewed and
thus is not a final sentence. The Court held, therefore, that sentenc-
ing by ajudge, and not ajury, will not frustrate the purposes behind
the imposition of the death penalty. 117
The petitioner also argued that the majority of states recognize
the importance of jury sentencing because of the unique nature of
the death penalty. 1 8 Thus, the petitioner urged the Court to adopt
this nearly unanimous opinion about the appropriateness of jury
sentencing and hold Florida's statute unconstitutional. 1 9 The
Court acknowledged that "30 out of 37 jurisdictions with a capital-
sentencing statute give the life-or-death decision to the jury, with
only 3 of the remaining 7 allowing a judge to override a jury's rec-
ommendation of life."' 120 The Court, however, rejected the peti-
tioner's argument with the following explanation:
[T]hat a majority ofjurisdictions has adopted a different practice, how-
ever, does not establish that contemporary standards of decency are
offended by the jury override. The Eighth Amendment is not violated
every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its
sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws.1211 "Although
ment they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help,
vigilante justice, and lynch law.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
113 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3163-64.
114 Id.
115 See supra notes 44-45.
116 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3164. Juries are representatives of the people, and Peti-
tioner argued that if the people are so outraged that they want the death penalty, then
only the jury can make this decision. Id. at 3163.
117 Id. at 3164.
118 Id. at 3163.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 3164. See infra note 128.
121 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3165. See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
The Court in Robinson held that a state has a variety of valid ways of imposing criminal
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the judgment of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in
the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amend-
ment" is violated by a challenged practice.122
Finally, the Court disposed of the petitioner's claim that in his
case, the trial court violated Florida's standard for allowing a trial
judge to override a jury's recommendation.123 The Court found
that the Florida Supreme Court followed its own standard of al-
lowing trial judges to override a jury recommendation only when
they conclude that no reasonable person would not impose the
death penalty124 and that trial courts make their decisions in a fair
and consistent manner. 125 The evidence indicated that the trial
judge had sufficient basis for his decision. The Court refused to dis-
turb the decision and, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Florida.' 26
B. THE DISSENT
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, 127 disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that a judge can sentence a defendant to death after a
jury has decided that such a sentence is inappropriate.
Justice Stevens reviewed the current societal standards with re-
spect to the death penalty and found that out of the thirty-seven
states authorizing capital punishment, 28 only three permit a judge
sanctions. The Court decided that it was the state, not the Court, that must choose the
method within this spectrum. Id. at 664-65.
122 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3165 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982)).
123 Id. at 3164-65.
124 See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975), where the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida announced its standard for when a jury override is permissible: "A jury recommen-
dation under our trifurcated death penalty statute should be given great weight. In
order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts
suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no rea-
sonable person could differ." Id. at 910.
125 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3166.
126 Id. The Court characterized its role in reviewing the action of the Florida court as
follows: "It is not our function to decide whether we agree with the majority of the
advisory jury or with the trial judge and the Florida Supreme Court." Id.
127 Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3167.
128 In twenty-nine states, a jury's verdict of life imprisonment is binding upon the
court. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp.
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1978 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a
(Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 11-4209 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to
17-10-32 (Recodified 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1 (Supp. 1983-84); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 532.025(I)(b) (Supp. 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.8 (West Supp.
1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1982); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 279, §§ 68, 70
(West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1983); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.006 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 (Sunp. 1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2c: I 1-
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to override a jury's recommendation of a life sentence.1 29 Justice
Stevens also observed that the current Florida statutory scheme
came about in response to the Court's decision in Furman v. Geor-
gia. 130 The Florida legislature wished to avoid arbitrary jury deci-
sions prohibited by Furman and thus gave the ultimate sentencing
power to the judge. Since Furman, however, the Court has approved
jury sentencing.' 3 1 In addition, Justice Stevens noted that although
in Florida a judge is not supposed to override the jury's decision
absent evidence that virtually no person could impose a lesser sen-
tence, 132 Florida trial judges have imposed the death penalty after
the jury recommended life imprisonment in eighty-three cases.' 33
Justice Stevens concluded that the appropriateness of a death
sentence depends upon the retributive justification.13 4 Thus, the
death sentence rests on an ethical, not a legal, judgment because the
"moral guilt"'' 3 of the defendant is an essential element of retribu-
3c (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000
(1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.024(D)(2) (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. tit., 21
§ 701.11 (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(f) (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-4 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 32-2-203 (1982); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp.
1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 3-207 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4 (Supp. 1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102 (1983). In Ne-
vada, although the jury has responsibility to impose the sentence in capital cases, a panel
ofjudges may impose the sentence if the jury cannot agree. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.554,
175.556 (1981). In four states, the penalty determination is made by a judge. See ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1979); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-301 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1979). In only three states may ajudge
overrule ajury's recommendation of life. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1982); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141 (West 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West Supp. 1984).
129 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3169 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens also pointed out that in Florida, a judge has overridden a jury's recom-
mended sentence of life imprisonment in 82 other cases. Id. at 3167. Alabama and
Indiana are the other two states that allow a jury override. See supra note 128.
130 Id. at 3170 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
131 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3170-71 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
132 Id. at 3171 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also supra
note 124.
133 At the time the case was heard before the Supreme Court, there had been eighty-
one cases in which the jury's decision of life imprisonment was disregarded by the trial
court that imposed the death sentence. In thirty-nine of these eighty-one cases, the
Florida Supreme Court either changed the sentence to life imprisonment or ordered a
new sentence of life imprisonment; in twenty-one cases, the Florida Supreme Court up-
held the lower court's death sentence; sixteen cases are still pending; and in three, other
outcomes occurred. Petitioner's Brief, Appendix B, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct.
3154 (1984).
134 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3174 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135 The Court attempted to define "moral guilt" in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
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tion.13 6 Justice Stevens found that only ajury, representing a cross-
section of the community, can adequately assess the moral guilt of a
defendant. 137
Justice Stevens explained this conclusion by stressing the im-
portance of tying a death sentence to community values.' 3 8 After
reviewing the evolution of the death penalty, Justice Stevens deter-
mined that historically, under the eighth amendment, the jury has
ensured that capital punishment is imposed in a decent manner,
consistent with current community values.' 3 9 In addition, Justice
Stevens observed that the Court previously had refused to allow
mandatory death sentences because such sentences lack an adequate
infusion of community values into the sentencing process.' 40 The
jury, which is composed of a cross-section of the community, must
be more representative of that community's values than an individ-
ual.' 4 1 Moreover, because juries and judges make significantly dif-
ferent capital sentencing decisions, a risk exists that a judicial
decision will not be consistent with community values.' 42
Thus, Justice Stevens found that the jury constitutes an essen-
tial element of capital punishment procedure by infusing the com-
munity's values into the decision. When a state does not convince a
jury that death is the appropriate punishment, a judge should not
have the ability to disregard the jury's opinion.' 43 To do so, con-
cluded the dissent, violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. 144
V. ANALYSIS
The Court's approval of Florida's capital punishment proce-
dure, which allows a judge to disregard a jury's advisory opinion,
departs from principles established by the Supreme Court in its re-
view of states' capital punishment statutes. In previous decisions,
the Court accorded great weight to the procedures and laws
adopted by a majority of the states in determining whether a partic-
ular state's death penalty statute satisfied the eighth amendment.
(1982). The Court stated that "moral guilt" depends upon the defendant's intentions,
expectations, and actions at the time of the crime. Id. at 800.
136 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3174 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 3175 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139 Id. at 3175-76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140 Id. at 3177 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 3177-78 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143 Id. at 3179 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144 Id.
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The Court had found it important to uncover a national attitude to-
ward a penalty as extreme as death, before finding it, or the proce-
dures imposing it, constitutional. 145 In Spaziano, however, the Court
virtually ignored the fact that a majority of states leave the imposi-
tion of the death penalty solely to the jury.' 46 Moreover, the Court
overlooked its previous mode of analysis used in death penalty cases
and minimized important policy considerations' 47 and empirical
data 48 supporting the jury as the final arbiter of the death penalty.
The Court also ignored the important constitutional protec-
tions of the eighth and fourteenth amendments in its affirmance of
Florida's capital punishment statute. These protections include: (1)
"That the State's power to punish 'be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards' ",;149 (2) "that capital punishment be adminis-
tered consistently with community values"; 5 0 and (3) that the pun-
ishment not be "cruel and unusual."' 15 Had the Supreme Court
completed a full review of precedent, it should have concluded that
only a jury can adequately achieve the eighth amendment protec-
tions guaranteed a person convicted of a capital crime.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INFUSION OF COMMUNITY VALUES IN
THE CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCESS
1. The Court Disregarded The National Opinion of The Death Penalty
Previously, the Court has stressed that the death penalty is
something that deserves uniform treatment in accord with national
norms because of the inclusion of evolving standards of human de-
cency in all capital sentences. 152 Thus, in prior decisions, the Court
looked to the statutory schemes adopted by a majority of the
states. 5 3 Although in Spaziano, the Court pointed out that Florida's
statutory scheme was not the norm,1 54 the Court concluded that
Florida did not have to follow a practice adopted by a majority of
states because the Court determines the constitutionality of a law.' 55
145 See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 128.
147 See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
149 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3177 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1975) (footnote omitted) (cita-
tion omitted)).
150 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3177-78.
151 Id. at 3172.
152 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976) (plurality opinion).
153 See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 594-96.
154 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3164-65. See also supra note 128.
155 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3165.
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The Court did not analyze the rationale behind looking to the laws
of other states nor did it acknowledge its past reasons for recogniz-
ing the need for uniformity of capital punishment laws.
In the past, the Court determined that the death penalty was
not a state issue, but a national issue. 156 The Court had reasoned
that the constitutionality of the death penalty required it to be con-
sistent with community values and evolving standards of decency. 157
Community values were defined as the view of the country as a
whole, which can be inferred from state statutes as well as jury deci-
sions.158 Moreover, although the majority in Spaziano refused to
give much weight to the prevailing viewpoint, Justice Stevens in his
dissent recognized that the "logical starting point" for the analysis
of the determination of the constitutionality of Florida's death sen-
tence was an examination of what the public, through its legislative
representatives, has concluded the law should be.' 59 The Court's
failure to fully examine the law adopted by a majority of the states
caused the Court to retreat from its past acknowledgement of the
importance of community input into a retributive punishment.' 60
The Court gave little weight to overall community values.
2. Retribution Is A Jury's Domain
Satisfying the need for retribution is one of the purposes be-
hind the imposition of the death penalty.' 61 One commentator has
concluded that the retributive motive is composed of two elements:
an idea of revenge by the victim or his family, and a statement by
society of its displeasure with the defendant's actions. 162 The Court
has approved both these factors when upholding either a death sen-
tence or a death penalty statute. 163 Specifically, in Gregg v. Geor-
gia,164 the Court relied upon the need for retribution in justifying
156 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
157 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242.
158 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794.
159 104 S. Ct. at 3169 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens noted that "'legislative measures adopted by the people's chosen representa-
tives weigh heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards of decency.'" Id. (quoting
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 294 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
160 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84.
161 Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3164.
162 Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 54-55 (1980).
163 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 454 (Powell, J., dissenting).
164 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Gregg, the plurality (Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) held that the death penalty could not be viewed in all cases as dispro-
portionate and, thus, as "cruel and unusual" punishment under the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. The Court, therefore, held that because Georgia's statute provided
the sentencing authority with information and guidance that eliminates arbitrary and
capricious imposition, it was constitutional. Id. at 207.
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the death penalty. The plurality held that "capital punishment is an
expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive con-
duct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential
in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes
rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs."' 65 Thus, the Court
has recognized that states impose the death penalty to effectuate the
needs of the individuals victimized by crime, the community inter-
ests that are affected by crime, and the need of the State to maintain
the confidence of its citizens by punishing criminals; in short, to vent
this "moral outrage." Because the jury is constitutionally required
to represent a cross-section of the population, 166 the jury, and not a
single judge, is best able to gauge this "moral outrage" and act
upon it.
In Gregg, the Supreme Court recognized the important role
served by jury sentencing for capital crimes when it determined that
"j]ury sentencing has been considered desirable in capital cases in
order 'to maintain a link between contemporary community values
and the penal system-a link without which the determination of
punishment could hardly reflect the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."' ... 167 The Court's
recognition of the jury's importance also was evidenced in Wither-
spoon v. Illinois,168 where the Court concluded that "[a] jury that
must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can
do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the con-
science of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death."1 69 It is clear that the Court's emphasis on community input
along with the societal basis of retribution calls for imposition of
capital punishment by a jury-"the voice of the community."
Although a judge is to some degree also a representative of the
165 Id. at 183.
166 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). The Court in Thiel determined
that "[t]he American tradition of trial by jury ... necessarily contemplates an impartial
jury drawn from a cross-section of the community." Id. at 220 (citing Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128 (1940)). In addition, the Court held that "juries must be indiscriminately
selected without systematic and intentional exclusion of any . . . substantial portion of
the community . . . that cannot be . . . excluded in whole or in part without doing
violence to the democratic nature of the jury system." Id. at 220-23. See also United
States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir. 1973).
167 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190 (plurality opinion) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion))).
168 391 U.S. 510 (1968). In Witherspoon, the Court held that because potential jurors
were excused for cause when they expressed doubts of imposing the death penalty, the
petitioner was denied an impartial trial guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Id. at 518.
169 Id. at 519 (footnote omitted).
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community, as a single representative he cannot provide the same
breadth of viewpoints as twelve people on a jury. One commentator
has concluded:
[Juries] are more likely to accurately express community values than
are individual state trialjudges. This is true because twelve people are
more likely than one person to reflect public sentiment, because jurors
are selected in a manner enhancing that likelihood and because trial
judges collectively do not represent-by race, sex, or economic or so-
cial class-the communities from which they come. 170
In an in-depth study of juries and the relationship between ju-
ries and judges, Kalven and Ziesel' 7l concluded that many
jury/judge disagreements result from the fact that juries will take
into account sentiments 172 about the individual defendant that a
judge will fail to weigh as heavily. 173 They base this conclusion on
the rationale that "the judge presumably does not draw the jury's
distinction . . . in . . cases because the formal law does not draw
it, and he is bound by tradition and role to stay within the senti-
ments of the formal law."' 74 Likewise, in the capital punishment
process, a judge probably will feel more bound to strictly apply the
statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating factors, 175 while a
jury may tend to use the factors more as guidelines. For example,
Kalven and Ziesel have found that
in the instance of the indecent exposure cases we have a sentiment that
must be felt very differently by different parts of the community.
There will be some people who completely share the law's view that
170 Gillers, supra note 162, at 163. The Supreme Court also noted:
Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad au-
thority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of
punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sen-
tencing convicted criminals. Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, . . . we do not
adopt or imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of sentences. Absent
specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment
for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence;
rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides only whether
the sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In view of the substantial
deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing
court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a
sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.
Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3009 (footnote omitted).
171 H. KALVEN & H. ZIESEL, THE AMERICANJuRY 55 (1966). Kalven and Ziesel found
that the variation between jury and judge convictions was related to the type of crime. A
great variation existed for the crimes of game law violations, indecent exposure, and
murder, while little variation was seen for the crimes of nonsupport, narcotics, disor-
derly conduct, and arson. Id. at 76.
172 The sentiments included personal characteristics of defendants, such as their fam-
ily, their court appearance, social status, and occupational record. Id. at 105.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 86.
175 See supra notes 44-45.
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indecent exposure is a crime irrespective of the maturity of the victim;
there will be some people who think it a ridiculous crime under all
circumstances; and, finally, there will be a considerable number who
see an important difference between exposure to adults and to chil-
dren. Since the juries are drawn from this population, they will reflect
in various combinations these differing sentiments.
1 76
Similarly, in the death sentencing process, differing viewpoints must
be represented, or at least have the possibility of being represented,
to achieve full expression of the community's "moral outrage."
Only ajury drawn from a cross-section of the community adequately
can achieve this goal.
B. SENTENCING DECISIONS MADE BY JUDGES WILL INCREASE THE
ARBITRARINESS AND INCONSISTENCY OF DEATH SENTENCES
In Spaziano, the Court neglected to consider the full impact of
the arbitrariness problem when a judge is left with the ultimate capi-
tal sentencing decision. Justice Douglas in Furman observed:
We know that the discretion ofjudges and juries in imposing the death
penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding
prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking
political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority,
and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected
position. 177
In Proffitt v. Florida,'78 the Court upheld Florida's capital punishment
statute because it addressed the constitutional deficiencies identified
in Furman by having the sentencer balance the legislatively pre-
scribed aggravating and mitigating factors against one another, 179
which ideally should eliminate most prejudices.
The plurality in Proffitt argued that judicial sentencing would
lead to a more consistent imposition of the death penalty because
judges have sentencing experience from previous capital cases.180
In 1980, however, it was determined that in Florida, the average
trial judge has made only three capital sentencing decisions in the
seven and one-half years since Furman.18 1 Three decisions over
seven and one-half years hardly qualifies judges as the experienced
sentencers the Court envisioned in Proffitt. Thus, the Court's argu-
ment in Proffitt that previous judicial sentencing experience leads to
176 H. KALVEN & H. ZIESEL, supra note 171, at 102.
177 Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
178 428 U.S. 242 (1975) (plurality opinion).
179 Id. at 252.
180 Id.
181 Gillers, supra note 162, at 59.
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greater sentencing consistency fails, because judges have not had
numerous opportunities to make capital sentences.
Moreover, the effect of prejudice in the sentencing decision
concerned the Court in Furman.182 While a judge is only one indi-
vidual, a jury is a cross-section of the community. When a jury of
twelve individuals combine to make a sentencing decision, the
prejudices of each juror are diffused among the prejudices of the
others. But when a single judge determines the death penalty, the
judge's prejudices impact on the sentencing decision undiluted.
In Barclay v. Florida,l83 Dobbert v. Florida,'8 4 and Projfitt v. Flor-
ida,185 however, the Court concluded that Florida's death penalty
statute was not arbitrary or discriminatory. 8 6 The Court noted that
the Florida Supreme Court had adopted exacting standards in Ted-
der v. State'8 7 that provided the only means for ajury's recommenda-
tion of a life sentence to be overridden by the trialjudge. In Tedder,
the Florida court held that "in order to sustain a sentence of death
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sen-
tence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could differ."' 88 In spite of this exacting stan-
182 See 408 U.S. at 249-57 (Douglas,J., concurring); id. at 291-95 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring); id. at 364-
66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
183 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983).
184 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
185 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
186 It is also important to examine the development of Florida's capital sentencing
statute and to note that until 1972, Florida required the jury to make the death penalty
decision. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3170 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Florida did not change its law until 1972 in an attempt to comply with the Court's
decision in Furman that held unconstitutional a capital punishment statute because it
achieved arbitrary results. Id. Prior to 1972, death was automatic for the capital of-
fenses of murder and sexual battery, absent ajury recommendation of mercy. In Dobbert
v. Florida, the Court reviewed Florida's statute and concluded that the new statute gave
more protection to a defendant than did the old statute. 432 U.S. at 295. The statute
provided:
(1) Recommendation to mercy.-A defendant found guilty by a jury of an offense
punishable by death shall be sentenced to death unless the verdict includes a recom-
mendation to mercy by the jury. When the verdict includes a recommendation to
mercy by the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. A
defendant found guilty by the court of an offense punishable by death when ajury is
waived shall be sentenced by the court to death or life imprisonment.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West 1973) (amended by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141
(West 1983)). It can be argued, however, that Florida provides statutory guidelines that
minimize the amount of arbitrariness in a decision. See supra notes 44-45.
187 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975). See supra note 124 for an explanation of the Tedder
standard.
188 322 So. 2d at 910. It seems odd that in 83 cases, a jury determined that the stan-
dards did not call for death, while the judge concluded that death was appropriate.
Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3167 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Of
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dard, authors of a recent article on Florida's capital punishment sys-
tem found that the Florida Supreme Court has affirmed only a little
over one-half of the death penalty cases it reviewed because it found
serious flaws or errors in the other one-half. 189 Moreover, the au-
thors determined that racial prejudice exists to some degree in Flor-
ida death sentences. 190 Further, when reviewing death sentences on
automatic appeal, the Florida Supreme Court has tended to follow a
jury recommendation of life imprisonment more than judicial over-
rides imposing the death penalty.' 91 The Florida Supreme Court
has upheld only twenty-one (33%) of the judges' override deci-
sions. 192 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court has found less occasion
to overturn jury decisions than judge decisions.' 93
Because of the statutory guidelines,19 4 the exacting Tedder stan-
dard, automatic appeal, and the Florida Supreme Court's scrutiny of
the sentences, Florida's death penalty statute assures retrospective
guarantee of nonarbitrariness through consistent application. This
the 83 cases, only twenty have been affirmed and five of those were subsequently vacated
on other grounds. The inmates whose life terms were overridden died by suicide. Brief
for Petitioner at 31 n.31, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984). The other two
states that provide for jury overrides, Indiana and Alabama, have exercised this discre-
tion only six times. See also Murry v. State, 3 Div. No. 604 (Ala. Crim. App.) (affirming
jury override), Appeal No. 82-743 (Ala.); Lindsey v. State, 1 Div. No. 483 (Ala. Crim.
App.) (affirming jury override); Neeley v. State, 7 Div. No. 145;Jones v. State, I Div. No.
377 (both pending in Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals); Shiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d
1047 (Ind. 1983) (Indiana Supreme Court affirming jury override); Jay Thompson v.
State, Indiana Supreme Court No. 822-§ 303 (Harrison County No. 81-562, sentenced
on March 18, 1972) (still pending).
189 Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and Death Penalty Appeals, 74J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 913, 922 (1983).
190 Id. at 921-22.
191 Id. at 923.
192 Brief for Petitioner, Appendix B, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984). In
Gorham v. Florida, No. 62,882, slip op. (Fla. 1984), the Florida Supreme Court upheld
the sentence of death, and in Cave v. Florida, 445 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1984), the Florida
Supreme Court also upheld the death sentence.
193 It would seem implausible that all 83 cases in which a Florida judge overrode the
jury's advisory opinion of life could withstand the court-approved scrutiny that virtually
no reasonable person could differ. By the very standard itself, most overrides should fail
because in every such case at least seven jurors, "reasonable people," concluded that the
death penalty should not have been imposed. The Florida Supreme Court has obviously
agreed because in over 67% of the cases it reviewed, the defendant received life impris-
onment.
Because death penalty cases are capital cases, twelve jurors are required by Florida
law. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10 (West 1970) ("Twelve persons shall constitute ajury to
try all capital eases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal
cases."). Florida law requires a unanimous jury in order to convict a defendant. FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.440 (1967). The advisory opinion, however, may reflect the sentencing
desires of only a majority of the jury (sevenjurors). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West
1970).
194 See supra notes 44-45.
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retrospective posture ignores the real purpose of the eighth amend-
ment protections guaranteed to defendants faced with capital
sentences: to avoid arbitrary or inconsistent imposition of the death
penalty at the trial level. As the Court noted in Solem v. Helm:
Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to
substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the ap-
propriateness of a particular sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth
Amendment the appellate court decides only whether the sentence
under review is within constitutional limits. 195
Thus, the appellate court is to determine only if the sentence is
either arbitrary or inconsistent. To ensure eighth amendment pro-
tection at the trial level, defendants must have the right to choose a
jury as their sentencer.
In addition, the sixth amendment's guarantee of a jury trial is
violated in situations where the jury's recommendation is not fol-
lowed. Unlike a typical sentencing proceeding, Florida's death pen-
alty statute, like a trial, requires that the sentencer make a
determination of the existence of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances. 196 In a trial, the sixth amendment guarantees that the
jury decide the facts. Likewise, the sixth amendment also must
guarantee a defendant the opportunity to have ajury determine the
verdict in the sentencing stage of a capital proceeding because it is a
fact-finding procedure. Moreover, Florida law prohibits a trial
judge from granting a motion to arrest the judgment in criminal tri-
als unless a defendant was unjustly convicted. 197 This statute indi-
cates that Florida considers a jury's guilt or innocence
determination final. By analogy, a judge should not be able to dis-
miss a jury's sentencing decision. The death sentence decision is a
fact-finding process for the jury that should be guaranteed by the
sixth amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Spaziano v. Florida affirming the death
195 Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3009 n.16.
196 See supra notes 44-45.
197 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.610 provides:
(a) The Court shall grant a motion in arrest ofjudgment only on one or more of
the following grounds:
(1) That the indictment or information upon which the defendant was tried is
so defective that it will not support ajudgment of conviction; (2) That the court
is without jurisdiction of the cause; (3) That the verdict is so uncertain that it
does not appear therefrom that the jurors intended to convict the defendant of
an offense of which he could be convicted under the indictment or information
under which he was tried; (4) That the defendant was convicted of an offense
for which he could not be convicted under the indictment or information under
which he was tried.
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sentence of the petitioner and the Court's specific affirmance of the
constitutionality of Florida's death penalty statute departed from
the Court's previous mode of analysis of capital punishment
schemes. Moreover, by failing to properly weigh the statutory
schemes adopted by a majority of the states, the Court neglected to
recognize fully the importance of the infusion of community values,
through the jury, in all death sentences. The Court has taken a step
backwards in its conclusion that juries are not essential to the death
sentencing process because, in prior decisions, the Court empha-
sized the important role that the community should play in the deci-
sion because of the retributive nature of the penalty. After a careful
analysis, the best conclusion that can be reached is that the Court
should have reversed the petitioner's death sentence because the
many flaws in Florida's capital punishment statutory scheme make
the statute unconstitutional. 198
JEFFREY ALAN WELLEK
198 Although constitutional requirements dictate a jury imposition of the death pen-
alty, if a case existed for which the jury override was appropriate, Spaziano would proba-
bly be it. There is no doubt that the aggravating circumstances in Spaziano outweighed
the mitigating circumstances. Even so, in most instances, the decision is still left to the
jury's discretion. In Spaziano, however, the trial judge incorrectly prohibited the jury
from using the presentence report that contained information about Spaziano's previous
felony convictions in their advisory opinion.
Although the constitutionality of Florida's law is in question, as well as the similar
statutes in Alabama and Indiana, see supra note 128, four other states-Arizona, Idaho,
Montana, and Nebraska-have the death penalty determination made by the judge
alone. See supra note 128. These statutes suffer to a greater degree from the same con-
stitutional problems as Florida's statute because they preclude any jury participation in
the sentencing process. It is enough to say that the death penalty statutes in seven states
should be declared unconstitutional because the absence of any "true" community input
in the decision, through the jury, violates the eighth amendment's protection against
cruel and unusual punishment.
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